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2026-10-22 RDP #Honeypot IOCs - 908 scans
Thread with top 3 features in each category and links to the full dataset
#DFIR #InfoSec

Top IPs:
221.6.237.66 - 90
82.223.10.125 - 70
82.223.17.218 - 68

Top ASNs:
AS8560 - 340
AS4837 - 90
AS8075 - 80

Top Accounts:
142.93.8.59 - 770
hello - 84
Administr - 10

Top ISPs:
arsys.es - 284
CNC Group CHINA169 Jiangsu Province Network - 90
Speed NET Internet Banda Larga Ltda - 68

Top Clients:
Unknown - 908

Top Software:
Unknown - 908

Top Keyboards:
Unknown - 908

Top IP Classification:
hosting - 486
Unknown - 318
mobile - 66

Pastebin links with full 24-hr RDP Honeypot IOC Lists:
Bad API request, invalid api_dev_key

#CyberSec #SOC #Blueteam #SecOps #Security

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2026-10-22 RDP #Honeypot IOCs - 454 scans
Thread with top 3 features in each category and links to the full dataset
#DFIR #InfoSec

Top IPs:
221.6.237.66 - 45
82.223.10.125 - 35
82.223.17.218 - 34

Top ASNs:
AS8560 - 170
AS4837 - 45
AS8075 - 40

Top Accounts:
142.93.8.59 - 385
hello - 42
Administr - 5

Top ISPs:
arsys.es - 142
CNC Group CHINA169 Jiangsu Province Network - 45
Speed NET Internet Banda Larga Ltda - 34

Top Clients:
Unknown - 454

Top Software:
Unknown - 454

Top Keyboards:
Unknown - 454

Top IP Classification:
hosting - 243
Unknown - 159
mobile - 33

Pastebin links with full 24-hr RDP Honeypot IOC Lists:
Bad API request, invalid api_dev_key

#CyberSec #SOC #Blueteam #SecOps #Security

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"Despite the port number, this traffic was in fact SFTP traffic being used to transfer the data."

Read the full report: https://thedfirreport.com/2025/06/30/hide-your-rdp-password-spray-leads-to-ransomhub-deployment

#DFIR #ThreatIntel

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The DFIR ReportHide Your RDP: Password Spray Leads to RansomHub Deployment - The DFIR ReportKey Takeaways Case Summary This intrusion began in November 2024 with a password spray attack targeting an internet-facing RDP server. Over the course of several hours, the threat actor attempted logins against multiple accounts using known malicious IPs (based on OSINT). Several hours later they then logged in via RDP with one of the previously […]
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2026-10-21 RDP #Honeypot IOCs - 302 scans
Thread with top 3 features in each category and links to the full dataset
#DFIR #InfoSec

Top IPs:
165.22.11.151 - 78
70.34.218.91 - 76
168.144.137.105 - 24

Top ASNs:
AS14061 - 102
AS20473 - 76
AS396982 - 24

Top Accounts:
probe - 154
hello - 54
142.93.8.59 - 28

Top ISPs:
DigitalOcean, LLC - 102
The Constant Company - 76
Google LLC - 24

Top Clients:
Unknown - 302

Top Software:
Unknown - 302

Top Keyboards:
Unknown - 302

Top IP Classification:
hosting - 260
Unknown - 34
proxy - 4

Pastebin links with full 24-hr RDP Honeypot IOC Lists:
Bad API request, invalid api_dev_key

#CyberSec #SOC #Blueteam #SecOps #Security

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2026-10-21 RDP #Honeypot IOCs - 151 scans
Thread with top 3 features in each category and links to the full dataset
#DFIR #InfoSec

Top IPs:
165.22.11.151 - 39
70.34.218.91 - 38
168.144.137.105 - 12

Top ASNs:
AS14061 - 51
AS20473 - 38
AS396982 - 12

Top Accounts:
probe - 77
hello - 27
142.93.8.59 - 14

Top ISPs:
DigitalOcean, LLC - 51
The Constant Company - 38
Google LLC - 12

Top Clients:
Unknown - 151

Top Software:
Unknown - 151

Top Keyboards:
Unknown - 151

Top IP Classification:
hosting - 130
Unknown - 17
proxy - 2

Pastebin links with full 24-hr RDP Honeypot IOC Lists:
Bad API request, invalid api_dev_key

#CyberSec #SOC #Blueteam #SecOps #Security

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We’re officially at capacity! Thank you to everyone who registered for the upcoming Volexity Cyber Sessions in Amsterdam. Registration is now closed.

If you’d still like to attend, join the waitlist and we’ll notify you if a spot opens up: luma.com/0qtkw49c

We look forward to seeing registered attendees on October 29 for an afternoon of DFIR talks, followed by an evening of dinner, drinks & networking!

#dfir

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When people say: "I can always tell an AI photo" usually means "I notice the bad ones". That's what it means to me today.

The usual advice is to count the fingers, check the teeth and earrings, and look for nonsense text in the background. It was good advice a couple of years ago. However, every new generator fixes exactly the "tells" people talk about.

Detection that works is trained: samples of real and generated content, compared until something separates them. It beats the human eye by a long way, but a detector can only recognise what it has been shown.

That is the problem with the arms race:
- Stable Diffusion's founder estimated its 2022 training compute at about US$600k (256 GPUs, ~150k GPU-hours); he put DALL-E 2 at roughly 1M GPU-hours
- Stanford's AI Index: ~US$78M of compute for GPT-4, ~US$191M for Gemini Ultra
- Epoch AI: hardware is roughly half to two-thirds of a frontier model's cost, staff 29–49%
- 2025 deepfake-detection rounds I could find: tens of millions
- Running a model once it exists: our 17-second explainer video took one GPU, ~5 hours, under A$10 (~US$6.50), open-licensed models

The risk that worries me most: a private generator with only a handful of images ever released. Nothing to train on, no detector has seen it, and eyeballing won't catch it. Worse if it also forges a camera's metadata and fingerprint, which works for cameras that don't protect their output. Camera makers are now signing and watermarking at the hardware level, so imitating that means breaking the protection, not copying a few EXIF fields.

So what still works? There's a check most people never think of: instead of trying to prove a photo is AI, try to prove it's real. It often tells you more, and it doesn't care which generator made the fake.

The full article covers how that works, why a screenshot or a forward can wipe out the evidence, the one thing I would tell anyone asked to judge a photo, the cost breakdown with sources, and the guides we wrote for each question people send me:

https://kennethbspringer.au/2026/10/21/is-this-photo-real-why-ai-is-making-that-harder-to-answer/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=article-26

#AI #Deepfakes #DigitalForensics #DFIR #ContentAuthenticity #infosec

Which is real or fake illustration. Two magnifying glasses one over real and the other over AI generated, both looks the same, hard to tell the difference
kennethbspringer.auIs This Photo Real? Why AI Is Making That Harder to Answer — Kenneth B. SpringerCan you still spot an AI photo by eye? Why detection is getting harder, what it costs to build a generator, and the checks that still work.
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New DFIR Thoughts post: Put AI in the code, not the conclusions 🎯

Ask a chatbot the same question ten times, get ten answers. Tested code gives one, and if it's wrong, you fix it once.

https://leapps.org/blog-post?post=2026-10-20-put-ai-in-the-code-not-the-conclusions

#DFIR #DigitalForensics #AI

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LEAPPsDFIR Thoughts: Put AI in the code, not the conclusions — LEAPPs BlogHanding examiners a chatbot that draws conclusions from parsed data is the wrong way to bring AI into digital forensics. Here is why, and what I do instead with a known-data corpus, tested code and CI checks.
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J

I’ve published an independent technical investigation into Hirudo, an Android banking RAT, focusing on its Indonesian banking-app replacement workflow, recovered APK artifacts, and associated infrastructure. This independent investigation was inspired by the research published by ThreatFabric. Motivated by their findings, I conducted a separate static reverse-engineering investigation focusing on Indonesian banking-app replacement artifacts, MQTT-based RAT communications, and additional infrastructure indicators. Sharing these findings with the cybersecurity community Cyber Defense Indonesia & Surabaya Hacker Link, to contribute to technical knowledge-sharing and further research into Android banking malware.

LINK:https://jeffanzos.medium.com/reverse-engineering-hirudo-indonesian-banking-targets-apk-replacement-and-rat-infrastructure-2b2890f0e4ca

Findings include: Banking app replacement (Recovered samples) associated with m-BCA, myBCA, BNI, BRI, BTN, Livin, JakOne, and BSI.

RAT infrastructure: Hardcoded C2 references and MQTT broker configurations recovered from DEX code, including 134[.]122.153[.]8:18085 and 134[.]122.153[.]8:1884.

APK internals: Hooking-engine artifacts, shared trigger-file mechanisms, certificate-substitution evidence, and embedded development paths.

Infrastructure pivots: Additional API endpoints, APK-processing panels, and certificate/DNS correlations for further investigation. The analysis is based primarily on static reverse engineering and supporting OSINT evidence. Live infrastructure behavior, several suspected relationships, and threat-actor attribution remain unverified. The objective is to document reproducible technical evidence and provide additional pivots for malware researchers, threat hunters, and incident responders.

#CyberSecurity #ThreatIntelligence #MalwareAnalysis #ReverseEngineering #DFIR #ThreatHunting #AndroidSecurity #DigitalForensics #InfoSec #InformationSecurity #CyberDefense #FinancialSecurity

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MediumReverse-Engineering Hirudo: Indonesian Banking Targets, APK Replacement, and RAT InfrastructureAn independent technical investigation into Hirudo, focusing on Indonesian banking-app replacement workflows, artifacts recovered from…
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2026-10-20 RDP #Honeypot IOCs - 249 scans
Thread with top 3 features in each category and links to the full dataset
#DFIR #InfoSec

Top IPs:
168.144.137.105 - 36
216.226.78.10 - 30
157.66.49.187 - 30

Top ASNs:
AS150895 - 60
AS14061 - 39
AS396982 - 36

Top Accounts:
hello - 120
Administr - 24
eltons - 15

Top ISPs:
DigitalOcean, LLC - 39
Google LLC - 36
LNK SYSTEMS MUNTENIA SRL - 30

Top Clients:
Unknown - 249

Top Software:
Unknown - 249

Top Keyboards:
Unknown - 249

Top IP Classification:
hosting - 162
Unknown - 57
hosting & proxy - 15

Pastebin links with full 24-hr RDP Honeypot IOC Lists:
Bad API request, invalid api_dev_key

#CyberSec #SOC #Blueteam #SecOps #Security

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Launched today: Agentmetry, a local-first endpoint sensor for AI coding agents. Open source, Apache-2.0.

The problem: coding agents now run shell commands, read files and call MCP tools with the developer's own permissions. The transcript is a conversation, not a record, and EDR sees a process start a process, which is exactly what a working agent looks like.

How it works:
- Hooks at the tool boundary of Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, GitHub Copilot, Antigravity, Qwen, Kimi, Qoder and CodeBuddy. Stdio MCP servers go through an audit proxy.
- Every tool call lands in a hash-chained JSONL trail on your machine. Edit one record and agentmetry verify fails. agentmetry anchor publishes a checkpoint the host cannot rewrite.
- Arguments are hashed inside the hook by default. DLP matches record the rule id, never the secret.
- Sequence detections, not single-event alerts: a credential read followed by network egress is one finding. Labelled with MITRE ATT&CK, and ATLAS where it adds something.
- MCP rug-pull detection: tools/list is fingerprinted per tool, so a listing that moves while the config stays the same is flagged (ATLAS AML.T0109).
- Forwards to Splunk, Elastic, Google SecOps or Microsoft Sentinel. No telemetry, nothing leaves until you configure a sink.

What it does not do:
- It only sees agents whose hooks are installed. A browser chat or an IDE with hooks off is invisible.
- It records what a shell call launched, not what that process did inside. That is your EDR's job.
- Windows and Linux are tested in CI. macOS is in preview.
- Public alpha, one maintainer.

The detection benchmark ships in the package: 57 cases, 0 missed, 0 false positives. Rerun it with agentmetry benchmark rather than trusting me.

Try it with nothing installed: uvx agentmetry demo
It replays a credential theft into a temp folder, raises the finding, then shows the trail failing verification after one edit.

Criticism very welcome, especially from anyone doing detection engineering or rolling agents out to a team.

Code: https://github.com/blitzcrieg1/agentmetry
Launch: https://www.producthunt.com/products/agentmetry

#infosec #AIsecurity #opensource #DFIR #detectionengineering #MCP

GitHubGitHub - blitzcrieg1/agentmetry: Local-first endpoint sensor for AI coding agents. Hash-chained audit trail, MITRE-mapped sequence detection, DLP. Forwards to the SIEM you already Local-first endpoint sensor for AI coding agents. Hash-chained audit trail, MITRE-mapped sequence detection, DLP. Forwards to the SIEM you already run. - blitzcrieg1/agentmetry
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2026-10-19 RDP #Honeypot IOCs - 8964 scans
Thread with top 3 features in each category and links to the full dataset
#DFIR #InfoSec

Top IPs:
154.36.174.33 - 7245
45.154.96.17 - 1566
136.244.100.79 - 18

Top ASNs:
AS979 - 7245
AS212815 - 1566
AS396982 - 36

Top Accounts:
hello - 7278
administrator - 108
Administrator - 90

Top ISPs:
NetLab Global - 7245
Dyjix SAS - 1566
Google LLC - 36

Top Clients:
Unknown - 8964

Top Software:
Unknown - 8964

Top Keyboards:
Unknown - 8964

Top IP Classification:
Unknown - 7263
hosting - 1695
mobile - 3

Pastebin links with full 24-hr RDP Honeypot IOC Lists:
Bad API request, invalid api_dev_key

#CyberSec #SOC #Blueteam #SecOps #Security

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2026-10-19 RDP #Honeypot IOCs - 5976 scans
Thread with top 3 features in each category and links to the full dataset
#DFIR #InfoSec

Top IPs:
154.36.174.33 - 4830
45.154.96.17 - 1044
136.244.100.79 - 12

Top ASNs:
AS979 - 4830
AS212815 - 1044
AS396982 - 24

Top Accounts:
hello - 4852
administrator - 72
Administrator - 60

Top ISPs:
NetLab Global - 4830
Dyjix SAS - 1044
Google LLC - 24

Top Clients:
Unknown - 5976

Top Software:
Unknown - 5976

Top Keyboards:
Unknown - 5976

Top IP Classification:
Unknown - 4842
hosting - 1130
mobile - 2

Pastebin links with full 24-hr RDP Honeypot IOC Lists:
Bad API request, invalid api_dev_key

#CyberSec #SOC #Blueteam #SecOps #Security

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2026-10-19 RDP #Honeypot IOCs - 2988 scans
Thread with top 3 features in each category and links to the full dataset
#DFIR #InfoSec

Top IPs:
154.36.174.33 - 2415
45.154.96.17 - 522
136.244.100.79 - 6

Top ASNs:
AS979 - 2415
AS212815 - 522
AS396982 - 12

Top Accounts:
hello - 2426
administrator - 36
Administrator - 30

Top ISPs:
NetLab Global - 2415
Dyjix SAS - 522
Google LLC - 12

Top Clients:
Unknown - 2988

Top Software:
Unknown - 2988

Top Keyboards:
Unknown - 2988

Top IP Classification:
Unknown - 2421
hosting - 565
mobile - 1

Pastebin links with full 24-hr RDP Honeypot IOC Lists:
Bad API request, invalid api_dev_key

#CyberSec #SOC #Blueteam #SecOps #Security

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↳ In reply to a post

Easy hunts: RuntimeBroker.exe running from %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\RuntimeBrokers, or a vshost*.exe with a .config next to it on a box that is not a dev machine. And if your users do not build code, MSBuild does not need to run there.

https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/blinder-tunnel-targets-critical-infrastructure/

Prevent MSBuild from running where it is not needed with app control, free with https://MagicSword.io: https://magicsword.io

#ThreatHunting #LOLBAS #DFIR

Unit 42Blinder Tunnel Campaign Targets Iraqi InfrastructureAnalysis of Blinder Tunnel, an Iran-nexus campaign using fake Dubai Airports recruitment lures and GitHub C2 malware to target critical infrastructure.
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